

## **THE CONSUMPTION AND (RE-) PRODUCTION OF 'DESIRE'**

di Sevgi Dogan

### I.

The concept of 'desire' is the main term of Hegel's philosophy, through which the self-consciousness actualizes itself. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel began to explain Self-consciousness with the title 'the truth of self-certainty.' Under this section, self-consciousness is related to the concept of 'desire;' because only by way of 'desire' self-consciousness can surpass what he calls 'simple I' (§174) which is only universal. This universal needs to find its particular into experiences. In this respect, in paragraph §174 Hegel claims that "self-consciousness is Desire."<sup>1</sup> It is desire of something outside of the self-consciousness. It is the object of self-consciousness, which exists independently from self-consciousness. But desire is not something in itself, so to speak, desire appears because of *needs*, because of an object, independent from self-consciousness. Therefore as Hegel pointed out "desire and the self-certainty...are conditioned by the object (§175)."<sup>2</sup> This object is the other. However, for Deleuze desire is not conditioned by needs and therefore by objects but they are originated in desire. Here is the question that should be asked to Deleuze: what does trigger desire or commence the movement or the process of desire? In this paper, this question shall be answered in terms of philosophy of Hegel, which we concern about, particularly in relation to Marx and Deleuze.

The needs and desire are directly related to each other in order to attain self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is different from consciousness because consciousness reflects on itself and becomes self-consciousness. In this respect, as Hegel pointed out, self-consciousness is absolutely for itself and "directly characterizes its object as a negative element, or is primarily desire (§168)."<sup>3</sup> Through experience, self-consciousness will discover the independency of object. In paragraph §176, Hegel speaks of three moments through which the notion of self-consciousness completes itself. In the first moment, self-consciousness is the pure undifferentiated 'I' as its first immediate object. Put it more clearly, the first immediate object of self-consciousness is pure undifferentiated ego (I) which Hegel determines as the independent and immediate object. In the second phase, this immediacy is superseded by cancelling the independent object. In other words, self-consciousness is 'desire'. By way of 'desire', self-consciousness directs itself to an independent object and at this point, immediacy (the first moment) is defined as a supersession of the independent object under favor of 'desire.' By way of the satisfaction of desire, self-consciousness reflects into itself. In so doing the immediacy and independency is negated. The third moment is in fact the 'double reflection' or 'the duplication of self-consciousness' (§176). In other words, the self-consciousness does not only reflect into itself but also reflect into the object because the object, which exists as an independent and differentiated being, is negated or superseded.

---

<sup>1</sup> Hegel, "Phenomenology of Spirit," in *Hegel Reader*, ed. Stephen Houlgate, Blackwell Publishers, 1998, p.91

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, "Phenomenology of Spirit," p.91

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, "Phenomenology of Spirit," p.89

The concept of 'desire' is defined to be self-consciousness and only through the satisfaction of desire, the self-consciousness completes itself within the reflection of itself. One might consider that satisfaction of desire is in Foucauldian sense to take pleasure. We will turn this point later. In other words, it is not enough to desire something but it must be realized or materialized. In this context, the actualization of desire is possible through approaching to the object of desire. What happens if desire cannot be satisfied? Is it possible to respond this question with the (re-)production of desire? Is it possible to interpret the satisfaction of desire as a consumption process? The aim of this essay is to elucidate and attempt to interpret the concept of 'desire' as a consumption and (re-) production process. The paper tries to indicate the relation of this process to production or to labor. Regarding these questions, the paper discusses the concept of 'desire' within the frame of the production and consumption dialectic, which Marx pointed out in the 'Introduction' to *Grundrisse*. Desire never loses its relation with production and even in modern period, the concept of desire is discussed in relation to the production process. Therefore, comparison with Deleuze and in some ways with Foucault lead us evaluate what the concept of desire is in Hegel through different perspectives.

## II.

Before going further in the analysis of 'desire' in terms of our argument, it is necessary to focus on the various discussions and interpretations on Hegel's philosophy and his method that help us to briefly overview his philosophy.

There are many interpretations concerning Hegel's philosophy, particularly Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Some of these interpretations are regarding the discussion of his method. For example according to Kenley Royce Dove, his method is not dialectical but rather "in a word, it is descriptive."<sup>4</sup> On the one hand, we cannot refute that it is descriptive but on the other hand, we cannot claim that it is not dialectical. It is true that *Phenomenology of Spirit* is a phenomenological method that reveals not only the knowledge of the object in itself but also our knowledge, the knowledge and relation between the object and subject. In this point, it is inescapable to argue that this relation of object to subject or versa versa is dialectical. In my view, *Phenomenology* is the exposition of spirit but this exposition is materialized itself through dialectical method. But it seems that the method of Hegel's *Phenomenology* is not only the descriptive and expositive but it contains also exploratory or discovery process which is dialectical. This dialectical method provides dynamism and continuity for the *Phenomenology*. It is misinterpretation and misunderstanding if you say the method of *Phenomenology* is only descriptive. More clearly and deeply, this sort of manifestation of Hegel's method leads the readers to comprehend Hegel's method deficiently and ignore the dynamism of *Phenomenology* as well as that of his other masterpieces. Kenley Royce Dove explains what the method of *Phenomenology* is as follows;

Hegel's method is radically *undialectical*. It is the experience of consciousness itself which is dialectical, and Hegel's *Phenomenology* is a

---

<sup>4</sup> Kenley Royce Dove, "Hegel's phenomenological method," in *G.W.F. Hegel: Critical Assessments*, edited by Robert Stern, volume III (Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Logic*), London, New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2004, p.17

viable philosophical enterprise precisely to the extent that it merely *describes* this dialectical process.<sup>5</sup>

It seems that Dove's assertion is self-contradictory. Paradoxically, he claims that Hegel's method is non-dialectical but then he defines Hegel's method as an experience of consciousness and this experience of consciousness is explicated as being dialectic. On the one hand, it is deduced that Hegel's method is "undialectical" but the experience of consciousness is dialectical. However, *Phenomenology* is the manifestation of spirit or mind<sup>6</sup>, which does not exist without experience of consciousness or merely experience. Therefore, his method is radically and consistently dialectical.

Another interpretation of Hegel's *Phenomenology* belongs to George Armstrong Kelly who claims that Kojève's interpretation of the lordship-bondage part lacks the phenomenological point of view. According to Kelly, the interpretation of Kojève as well as Marx who regard "lordship and bondage relationship" as "a purely social phenomenon"<sup>7</sup> is one-sided reading. Instead of this one-sided reading, George Armstrong Kelly suggests another way in demonstrating correct interpretation of lordship and bondage through three angles. The first angle has already introduced by Kojève, which is the social. "Another regards the shifting pattern of psychological domination and servitude within the individual ego."<sup>8</sup> And the third angle is the unity of these two processes. In other words, "the interior consequences wrought by the external confrontation of the Self and the Other, the Other and the Self, which has commenced in the struggle for recognition (*Kampf des Anerkennens*)."<sup>9</sup> It seems that there is still only one angle, which includes two other angles. Put differently, the reading or interpretation of lordship and bondage relationship regarding the social perspective contains also "the shifting pattern of psychological domination and servitude within the individual ego"<sup>10</sup> and their interrelation manner or their confrontation in an attempt to be recognized. According to Kelly, the 'phenomenological' dimension regarding lordship and bondage is lacking in Kojève's interpretation.<sup>11</sup> Although Kelly's comment on the lordship and bondage relationship is not concerning Hegel's method, it seems that the assertions of Kelly and Dove amount to the same thing.

Hegel's concern is always how it is possible to realize ourselves in the world. For this reason, Hegel emphasizes on phenomenal world. However, Hegel considers this world through a

---

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, "Hegel's phenomenological method," p. 21. Regarding Hegel's method, in the notes, Dove points out that from Trendelenburg to Findlay, many commentators contend that Hegel's method is not dialectical. But according to him indeed Ivan Iljin is the first commentator developing this insight in this work, *Die Philosophie Hegels als kontemplative Gotteslehre* (Bern, 1946) even though Iljin's argument does not only refer to the *Phenomenology* but Hegel's other works.

<sup>6</sup> Richard Kroner claims, "In his concept of *Geist* Hegel found the inseparable connection between mind and spirit, between the human and the divine. This is the greatest of all his discoveries. The early writings, especially *The Spirit of Christianity*, tell the story of this discovery. Hegel is the founder of the philosophy of mind." (G.W.F. Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, translated by T.M. Knox with an introduction, and Fragments translated by Richard Kroner, Harper Torchbook, 1961, p.33)

<sup>7</sup> George Armstrong Kelly, "Notes on Hegel's 'lordship and bondage,'" in *G.W.F. Hegel: Critical Assessments*, edited by Robert Stern, volume III (Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit and Logic*), London, New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2004, p.165

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, "Notes on Hegel's 'lordship and bondage,'" p.165

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, "Notes on Hegel's 'lordship and bondage,'" p.165

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, "Notes on Hegel's 'lordship and bondage,'" p. 165

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, "Notes on Hegel's 'lordship and bondage,'" p.174

dialectical process, through the concrete things, through the experiences, through desire, through desire of production, objects, etc.

### III.

What is desire? It seems very simple question; actually, for Gilles Deleuze it is not difficult to answer. It is a “simplest thing in the world.”<sup>12</sup> Through the history of philosophy, according to Michel Foucault, the philosophers talk about the concept of desire many times and there are many books on desire in contrast to pleasure.<sup>13</sup> For Foucault, desire is a kind of ‘lack’ although he claims that in the Greco—roman literature, there is no difference between desire and pleasure, they always talked about being “slave or free from desire/pleasure.”<sup>14</sup> One might consider that satisfaction of desire corresponds to “taking pleasure” in Foucauldian sense. But on the modern period, Foucault prefers ‘pleasure’ to ‘desire’ while Deleuze is in favor of ‘desire.’ Deleuze’s response to the question (what desire is) is: “constructing an assemblage.”<sup>15</sup> In the modern period, the problem of desire appears mostly because of the emergence of psychology, psychoanalysis. However, in this paper we will discuss the problem of desire in philosophical terms particularly in Hegel’s philosophy. For Hegel, desire is a triggering mechanism, producing-provoking to give rise to progress.

In an interview, Deleuze, when speaking of the concept of desire, says, “There are no philosophical concepts that do not refer to non-philosophical coordinates. It [desire] is very simple very concrete”<sup>16</sup> like other philosophical or non-philosophical concepts. With this statement, Deleuze demonstrates how his view of the concept and philosophy is materialistic (in philosophical sense) and how he is close to Hegel and Marx, even though, as it is well known, Deleuze dislikes Hegel and harshly attacks him. To say that desire is very concrete, but not by itself precisely means to say what Hegel discusses about Kant’s thing-in-itself. Simply and clearly, everything exists in phenomenal world.

Franz Brentano contends, “Consciousness is always consciousness of.”<sup>17</sup> This statement is applicable to the concept of ‘desire’ as well: desire is always desire of something although Deleuze states “Desire does not lack anything; it does not lack its object. It is, rather, the subject that is missing in desire, or desire that lacks a fixed subject.”<sup>18</sup> In other words, desire is based on the multiple subjects. In a dialogue, Foucault says to Deleuze, he cannot “bear the word desire;”<sup>19</sup> instead, he favors the word ‘pleasure’ that Deleuze cannot bear although Foucault says, “Desire and pleasure is like an entity that cannot be disassociated.”<sup>20</sup> It seems that what ‘desire’ is for Deleuze is ‘pleasure’ for Foucault; both are productive for both philosophers. After the definition of these great philosophers on ‘desire,’ one might say while ‘desire’ signifies to be on the road, ‘pleasure’ is to be at the end. The former is a process; the latter is a condition.

<sup>12</sup>See an interview with Gilles Deleuze: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IrZdOZzr4as>

<sup>13</sup>Michel Foucault, *Foucault’s lecture Berkeley*, 1983, see: <http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpfoucault4.htm>

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*, *Foucault’s lecture Berkeley*, 1983, see: <http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpfoucault4.htm>

<sup>15</sup> See an interview with Gilles Deleuze: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IrZdOZzr4as>

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, an interview with Gilles Deleuze: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IrZdOZzr4as>

<sup>17</sup> See Dove, “Hegel’s phenomenological method,” p. 18

<sup>18</sup>Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2000, p. 26

<sup>19</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Desire & Pleasure*, trans. Melissa McMahon, 1997, see: <http://www.artdes.monash.edu.au/globe/delfou.html>

<sup>20</sup> Michel Foucault, *Foucault’s lecture Berkeley*, 1983, see: <http://www.generationonline.org/p/fpfoucault4.htm>

It seems to Foucault desire corresponds to 'lack.'<sup>21</sup> However, for Deleuze, pleasure does not have any positive value; the reason is that it interrupts "the immanent process of desire."<sup>22</sup> Deleuze clarifies desire as it were for Foucault: "for me, desire does not comprise any lack; neither is it a natural given; it is but one with an assemblage of heterogeneous elements which function; it is process, in contrast with structure or genesis [...]."<sup>23</sup> What do these statements mean? They present us that desire does not exist only in relation with the simple verb or word 'desire' or that it does not exist only as a relation to something. It is an aggregation of relations, on which Hegel and Marx (particularly, in *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*) emphasize many times.

It seems that Deleuze makes these phrases just to disapprove Hegel. These statements completely are contrary to Hegel's understanding of desire. For Hegel, desire is desire of something, desire of creation, of production, of recognition. Desire in Hegel lacks of something; it lacks of its object in contrast to desire in Deleuze. Because of this 'lack,' the subject gravitates towards the object of desire. Although it is obvious that the concept of desire signifies different meaning in both philosophers, there is something in common: desire is a sort of *productive force*; desire is a *process*.

#### IV.

In general, the *Phenomenology* is described as the progressive development of *Geist* (spirit or mind). In this respect, Hegel divides the *Phenomenology* in three main stages: "Consciousness", "Self-consciousness", and "Reason." these each stage contains sub-stages as well. Every moment creates the subsequent one. Hegel begins with natural consciousness in the section "Consciousness" and then progresses increasingly to the more sophisticated forms of consciousness. In each stage, Hegel demonstrates how the previous stage (or the form of consciousness) is overcome and thus comes close to higher stage through dialectical movement.

§36 The mind's immediate existence, conscious life, has two aspects— cognition and objectivity which is opposed to or negative of the subjective function of knowing. Since it is in the medium of consciousness that mind is developed and brings out its various moments, this opposition between the factors of conscious life is found at each stage in the evolution of mind, and all the various moments appear as modes or forms (*Gestalten*) of consciousness.<sup>24</sup>

Roughly speaking, in the phase of "Consciousness," the object of sensation is known by subject as something outside of itself. And this object of sensation is not identical with it. In the second moment, that is, in "Self-consciousness," the same subject returns to itself and reflect on itself as a finite consciousness. In the last stage of "Reason," the subject recognizes Nature and History, which is related to the subject as the objective expression of infinite Spirit. At this point, it is important to emphasize on the distinct between Kant's

---

<sup>21</sup>Gilles Deleuze, *Desire & Pleasure*, trans. Melissa McMahon, 1997, see: <http://www.artdes.monash.edu.au/globe/delfou.html>

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, *Desire & Pleasure*, trans. Melissa McMahon, 1997, see: <http://www.artdes.monash.edu.au/globe/delfou.html>

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*, *Desire & Pleasure*, trans. Melissa McMahon, 1997, see: <http://www.artdes.monash.edu.au/globe/delfou.html>

<sup>24</sup>G.W.F. Hegel, "The Phenomenology of Spirit," Preface, §36, p.60

'understanding' and Hegel's 'Reason.' It is the main question why Hegel does not satisfy with 'understanding.' It seems that the problem of dissatisfaction with 'understanding' is related to the subject itself who 'desires' and 'wills.' In other words,

Hegel charges Kant with leaving the subject outside. According to Hegel, Kant mentions the *self*, but Kant's *self* only tends to get the knowledge of objects. For Hegel, this *self* lacks individuality or personality. In other words, for Hegel, it is not possible that the *self* could think over itself. It can be explained that human being does not only try to explain the external world but also tries to understand itself. Thus s/he gives the name of "I" to that being. S/he mentions "I" by turning back on itself. To speak of the *self* depends on saying "I" and it is only possible by way of 'Desire.'<sup>25</sup>

'Desire' reveals the subject and through 'desire' human beings come back to themselves. 'Desire' of human beings strives to satisfy itself by way of negating, or transforming action. However, there is difference between 'desire' of animal and that of human beings; because 'desire' of animals is relied on saving and preserving life while 'desire' of human beings is the realization and manifestation of human being themselves as well as saving and preserving life. In other words, 'desire' of animals is depended on an object; this can be defined as 'desire' of object. But 'desire' of human beings involves 'desire' of recognition by other, so to speak, by other self-consciousness, (as Hegel points out, "self-consciousness is *Desire* in general"<sup>26</sup> (§167)). Accordingly, 'desire' of animals cannot bring back to itself as self-consciousness does.

The paper tries to interpret the concept of 'desire' in relation to consumption and production. Indeed the basic point is not 'desire' *in itself* or *mere* 'desire' but rather the *satisfaction* of 'desire' is the most significant point; that is, the *activity* of 'desire' or to get it into the act is that which leads self-consciousness to manifest itself in Nature and History. We have to consider the concept of 'desire' with the relation of others. As Deleuze points out, "I never desire something all by itself."<sup>27</sup> 'Desire' must have a context. In other words, to apply 'desire' to external world comes to mean the consumption of 'desire' as well. Thus, it drags self-consciousness into a certain moment. Hegel's satisfaction of 'desire' appears as the consumption of 'desire'. With the consumption of 'desire', I intend to say the consumption of the object of 'desire'. The gratification of 'desire' refers to the process of consumption. For the consumption, human beings need to produce 'new desire.' Needless to say, when we consume our 'desire', we can produce another 'desire.' However, my basic question is as follows; what happens if 'desire' is not (satisfied) consumed? If we do not consume our 'desire', then 'desire' exists only theoretically. When I could not consume my 'desire,' it might be difficult to generate 'a new desire' and therefore I fall into a crisis. It is an existential crisis. This crisis is overcome only by creating a 'desire'. Accordingly, the realization or

---

<sup>25</sup>Sevgi Doğan, *Hegel and Marx on Alienation*, Master thesis submitted to the Graduate School of Social Science of Middle East Technical University, February 2008, p.46

<sup>26</sup>Hegel, "The Phenomenology of Spirit," in *The Hegel Reader*, ed., Stephen Houlgate, Blackwell Publishers, 1998, §168, p.88

<sup>27</sup>Deleuze explains this by giving some examples; for example if we desire a dress, we do not desire a simple or general dress but "this particular dress," in some context, in relation to our life, in relation to our work, in relation to other people who we know or we do not know, does not matter! Another example is to desire to drink. Deleuze claims "Drinking never meant solely 'I desire to drink'" but it can be meant many things, such as, to find a friend or for relaxing etc... See interview with Deleuze: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IrZdOZr4as>

actualization of 'desire' is but possible only by the consumption of 'desire' or 'desire' of object.

However, it is important to point out that 'satisfaction' is different from 'consumption.' More clearly, satisfaction is subordinate to consumption. The process of satisfaction appears after the process of consumption. It is possible that you consume something but you do not satisfy what you consume. Let us cite from *Grundrisse* in which Marx explains the relationship between production, consumption, and distribution.

[...] In consumption, the products become objects of gratification, of individual appropriation. Production creates the objects which correspond to the given needs; distribution divides them up according to social laws; exchange further parcels out the already divided shares in accord with individual needs; and finally, in consumption, the product steps outside this social movement and becomes a direct object and servant of individual need, and satisfies it in being consumed. Thus production appears as the point of departure, consumption as the conclusion [...].<sup>28</sup>

This is a sort of circulation. According to Marx, just as "production is... immediately consumption", so "consumption is also immediately production."<sup>29</sup> For instance, by consuming an apple you produce your physical body. The former is determined as *productive consumption* and the latter is *consumptive production*. Marx then points out that production creates material for consumption. It means that there is not only immediate relationship between production and consumption but also mediate relationship in question.<sup>30</sup> Without production, "consumption would lack an object. However, consumption also mediates production, in that it alone creates for the products the subject for whom they are products. The product only obtains 'last finish' in consumption."<sup>31</sup> In this regard, it appears that the concept of 'desire' contains both production and consumption within itself. The dialectical relationship between production and consumption is an indication of dialectic in 'desire.' To consume what we desire, and therefore to satisfy it, we consume the object of 'desire' *immediately* (e.g., we can find an apple in the nature without cultivating it or we wear (ready-made) garment which is produced by others) or we produce the object of desire, after which only we consume it *mediately* and satisfy our 'desire.'

Hegel relates the concept of 'desire' to labor in the section *Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage*. In this relationship, the master is independent from thing while the slave works on and shapes it. In other words, the master relates himself to the thing through the slave who "works only on it (§190)." While the slave has immediate relationship with the thing, in the sense of working on it, "To the master, on the other hand by means of this mediating process, belongs the immediate relation, in the sense of the pure negation of it, in other words he gets the enjoyment."<sup>32</sup> The master gets the enjoyment of it within the immediate relation to the thing. In this respect, Hegel points out "What desire

---

<sup>28</sup>Karl Marx, "The Grundrisse," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C. Tucker, 2nd ed., W.W. Norton & Company: New York, 1978, p. 227.

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*, "The Grundrisse," pp.228-29 .

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*, "The Grundrisse," p. 229.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, "The Grundrisse," p.229.

<sup>32</sup>Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, translated, with an introduction and notes by J. B. Baillie, Harper Torchbooks, 1967, §190, p.235

failed to achieve, he succeeds in doing, viz. to have done with the thing altogether, and to achieve satisfaction in the enjoyment of it. Desire failed to do this because of the thing's independence."<sup>33</sup> Therefore, the master is dependent on the slave's labor and "has the pure enjoyment of it [thing]."<sup>34</sup> In this context, inevitably one might say that 'desire' is actualization and manifestation of subject. In other words, according to Hegel, desire achieves its existence not through enjoyment of the desire of object but laboring or working on this desire and thus on its object. If the object desired is independent from the subject, the subject gets only the enjoyment of it as the master does. Because of this independency, the master failed to achieve his 'desire,' which remained mere enjoyment. This enjoyment corresponds to mere consumption without (re-)production. In this respect, Hegel claims "Desire has reserved to itself the pure negating of the object and thereby its unalloyed feeling of itself."<sup>35</sup> The reason why this satisfaction is only pure negation is because it lacks of the objective side, or "the objectivity or subsistence."<sup>36</sup> More clearly, 'desire' needs to be objectified. The objectification is associated to 'labor' or 'work.' Labor forms and shapes 'desire,' meanwhile it shapes the thing. Relating to this point, Hegel states that "work, on the other hand, is desire held in check, fleetingness staved off; in other words, work forms and shapes the thing."<sup>37</sup>

At this point, one might say that there is a similarity between Hegel and Deleuze when they speak of the nature of desire. While Hegel says that work is desire; desire is production, Deleuze says, "Desire is to construct an assemblage; to construct an aggregate; the aggregate of skirt, of sun ray, of street, an assemblage of a woman, of a vista [...]."<sup>38</sup> For Deleuze it is aggregate of relations like Hegel and Marx. Desire constructs an aggregate of relations according to Deleuze.<sup>39</sup>

#### IV.

In conclusion, 'desire' is immediately related to 'labor' and 'satisfaction' in Hegel, which in some way can be identified with 'production' and 'consumption' in Marx. If you do not satisfy or more correctly consume your desire, sometimes it creates a crisis that also prevents to produce a new desire. For this reason, there are two possibilities for the solution of crisis; either I have to give up my first desire to which I could not achieve to attain and therefore pursue another desire; or I have to actualize my desire and I have to try to obtain it until I succeed to attain my desire. Hegel did not speak of this point but Hegel says that desire appears or reveals itself when it objectifies or embodies itself in an object. That is, it is the production of desire and also contains in the consumption of desire in itself; because with the production process or by laboring on the thing, on the one hand you produce the thing what you desire, that is, your desire; on the other hand, you produce something for consumption, (because according to Marx, without consumption, production is purposeless.<sup>40</sup>), which involves potential *new* 'desire'.

Therefore, the realization and manifestation of desire without the production and the consumption is not possible.

---

<sup>33</sup>Hegel, "The Phenomenology of Spirit," §190, p.96

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., Hegel, "The Phenomenology of Spirit," §190, p.96

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., Hegel, "The Phenomenology of Spirit," p.97

<sup>36</sup>G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, §195, p.238

<sup>37</sup>Hegel, "The Phenomenology of Spirit," §195, p.97

<sup>38</sup> See <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IrZdOZzr4as>

<sup>39</sup> See <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IrZdOZzr4as>

<sup>40</sup>Marx, "The Grundrisse," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, p.229

“Its [capitalism’s] infrastructure, even its economy, was inseparable from the phenomena of desire. And fascism too—one must say that it has ‘assumed the social desires’, including the desires of repression and death. People got hard-ons for Hitler, for the beautiful fascist machine.”<sup>41</sup> Desire creates new needs but this desire appears not by itself but rather by capitalist system. Desire does not always appear because of needs but also just because of taking pleasure. It is right that, as Hegel asserts, needs or objects condition desire but there is also pleasure waiting to be satisfied. I desire something not because I need it but because I want to take pleasure from it. I desire it, I take pleasure from it, and I consume it. While I consume it at the same time, I produce myself and then I re-produce a new desire and a new consumption.

In *Grundrisse*, in “Introduction,” Marx writes that “No production without a need.”<sup>42</sup> Is it true for capitalist society? The answer is very simple: in capitalist society, you do not need to feel a lack of need to produce. Production in capitalist society does not presuppose a need. Instead, production just needs a consumer and a feeling of pleasure and satisfaction. Then Marx adds that “But consumption reproduces the need.”<sup>43</sup> The consumption of desire, the consumption of pleasure and satisfaction reproduce the need.

Deleuze, the modern thinker, made the similar point. In capitalist society, as Deleuze points out, “desire is not bolstered by needs, but rather the contrary; needs are derived from desire: they are counterproducts within the real that desire produces.”<sup>44</sup> It means that new desires are new needs! Capitalist system leads you to desire and thus produce new needs. However, this desire is not the desire *to* produce but it is desire *of* consumption. Desire of consumption substitutes for the satisfaction to produce and therefore production becomes only a compulsory activity but consumption becomes the main activity of human beings. As Deleuze mentions, human being is a sort of desiring-machine, which seems to be equal with the consumption-machine.

---

<sup>41</sup> Interview with Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari: <http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpdeleuze7.htm>

<sup>42</sup> Marx, “The Grundrisse,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, p.229

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, “The Grundrisse,” p.229

<sup>44</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2000, p. 27

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alexander Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit*, ed. Allan Bloom, translated from French by James H. Nichols, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1980 [trans. Turkish by Selahattin Hilav, *Hegel Felsefesine Giriş*, Yapı Kredi Yayınları, second edition, İstanbul, 1996]

Bariş Parkan, *Marx*, Say Yayınları, İstanbul 2011

George Armstrong Kelly, "Notes on Hegel's 'lordship and bondage,'" in *G.W.F. Hegel: Critical Assessments*, ed. Robert Stern, volume III (Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Logic*), London, New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2004

G.W.F. Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, translated by T.M. Knox with an introduction, and Fragments translated by Richard Kroner, Harper Torchbook, 1961

—*The Phenomenology of Mind*, translated with an introduction and notes by J. B. Baillie, Harper Torchbooks, 1967

—"Phenomenology of Spirit," in *The Hegel Reader*, ed. Stephen Houlgate, Blackwell Publishers, 1998

Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2000

Karl Marx, "The Grundrisse," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C. Tucker, W.W. Norton & Company: New York, 1978

Kenley Royce Dove, "Hegel's Phenomenological method," in *G.W.F. Hegel: Critical Assessments*, ed. Robert Stern, volume III (Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Logic*), London, New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2004

Robert Stern (ed.), *G.W.F. Hegel: Critical Assessments*, volume III (Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Logic*), London, New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2004

Robert C. Tucker (ed.), *The Marx-Engels Reader*, W.W. Norton & Company: New York, 1978

Sevgi Doğan, *Hegel and Marx on Alienation*, Master thesis submitted to the Graduate School of Social Science of Middle East Technical University, February 2008

Sources on internet:

Gilles Deleuze, *Desire & Pleasure*, trans. Melissa McMahon, 1997, see:

<http://www.artdes.monash.edu.au/globe/delfou.html>

Interview with Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari: <http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpdeleuze7.htm>

Interview with Gilles Deleuze: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IrZdOZzr4as>

Michel Foucault, *Foucault's lecture Berkeley*, 1983, see:

<http://www.generationonline.org/p/fpfoucault4.htm>



[www.dialetticafilosofia.it](http://www.dialetticafilosofia.it)

Quest'opera è distribuita con Licenza [Creative Commons Attribuzione - Non commerciale - Non opere derivate 4.0 Internazionale](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)